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1 Introduction
The representative agent model has long been an important workhorse for economics and
in the last 3 decades it has become the dominant macroeconomic approach. Todays rep-
resentative agent models are characterized by an explicitly stated optimization problem
for the representative agent, which can be either a consumer or a producer. The derived
individual demand or supply curves are then in turn used for the corresponding aggre-
gate demand or supply curves. The moments of the aggregates in these models are then
compared with time series observations of the macroeconomy. Implicit in this approach
is that any underlying heterogeneity across agents or rms averages out and does not
have any implications for the behaviour of the aggregate economy. An aggregate shock
whether to technology or to nominal demand generates a spread-preserving mean shift
in the economy. However, Haltiwanger (1997) has argued that statistical agencies should
report the higher moments of economic activity; for example, the distribution of aggre-
gate output across sectors and rms. Moreover, recent research into the cross sectional
distribution of behaviour at business cycle frequencies has raised some questions about
the usefulness of the representative agent model for explaining certain regularities. In
particular the shape of the cross section is sensitive to business cycle shocks.1 Macroeco-
nomic shocks do not have a spread-preserving e¤ect on the behaviour of rms. Evidence
for the US (Higson et al (2003)), for the UK (Higson et al, 2004), Germany (Dopke et
al, 2005) and Italy (Santoro, 2005) suggests a systematic tendency for the cross sectional
distribution in rm growth rates to vary with the business cycle.
These stylised facts of the business cycle need some explanation. In this paper we
consider a model of heterogeneous rms functioning in imperfectly competitive markets
who may be in di¤erent nancial states.2 Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Greenwald and
Stiglitz (1993), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke et al. (1996, 1999) show that in
the presence of asymmetric information, nancing constraints can be important for both
investment and production decisions.
The more recent literature, however, is essentially concerned with the emergence of
nancial fragility in a perfect competition setting on the real side of the economy. The
model of Greenwald and Stiglitz assumes that each rm faces an innitely elastic demand
function subject to a random idiosyncratic shock, which captures uncertainty regarding
relative prices. Uncertainty arises because rms are price takers and there is a one-period
lag between when rms borrow on the credit market, hire workers and production takes
place, and when they sell their output. Firms are unable to raise external nance on
the stock market because of equity rationing (Greenwald et al. (1984) and Myers and
Majluf (1984)). Therefore, they rely on internally generated funds as the primary source
of funding and resort to bank credit if internal funds are insu¢ cient to nance the wage
bill. As a consequence, rms face an explicit risk of bankruptcy3.
By construction the probability of bankruptcy is a decreasing function of the net
1It should be noted that these cross section ndings use unweighted growth rates of rms, so it is
possible that while the interaction of aggregate shocks and rm behaviour generates interesting cross
sectional dynamics this does not carry over signicantly to the aggregate economy which is of course the
weighted sum of rm outputs.
2For a recent review of heterogeneous models see Hommes (2005). Of course, there may be other
models that can also explain the stylised facts of the business cycle seen from the cross section, but we
do not consider them here.
3See Levin, Natalucci and Zakrajsek (2004) for a recent empirical examination of the importance of
bankruptcy costs for nancial frictions in nancial markets.
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worth of the rm. The higher net worth (the lower nancial fragility) relative to the
wage bill, the lower the probability of bankruptcy will be. Therefore, if bankruptcy is
costly, production is increasing in net worth. By assumption, Greenwald and Stiglitz rule
out any strategic interaction.
A di¤erent approach is taken in the theoretical framework put forward by Delli Gatti
et al. (2000, 2005, 2007) in which rms are heterogeneous in terms of size and the degree
of nancial fragility and interact through the credit market. Their model shows how a
parsimonious non-linear framework can generate a rich set of stylized facts both from
a cross-sectional and from a dynamic point of view. However the agent-based model
introduced by Delli Gatti et al. (2000) focuses on the indirect interaction on the credit
market through the presence of a commercial banking sector, ruling out any interaction on
the goods market. More recently, Bischi et al. (2004), incorporate imperfect competition
and strategic interactions among rms.
In this paper we seek to extend this model by incorporating it into a wider macro-
economic framework. We consider a monopolistically competitive market populated by
heterogeneous rms, who di¤er because of their nancial structure. Financial conditions
a¤ect both the rm-specic level of output and the competitors output through the
conventional demand function of monopolistic competition à la Blanchard and Kiyotaki
(1987). Furthermore, nancial fragility a¤ects exit and entry of rms because of an ex-
plicit risk of bankruptcy. Shocks to the economy, both of an aggregate and idiosyncratic
nature, have a di¤erent impact depending on the nancial condition of the rm. Depend-
ing on their nancial robustness, monetary policy a¤ects rms in di¤erent ways. At the
same time, commercial banks determine the contractual interest rate on loans following
a mark-up pricing rule over the interbank interest rate: the mark-up is determined as a
weighted average of the rm-specic probability of bankruptcy as well as of an index of
performance of the overall credit market.
Firms set their prices simultaneously given private information, but price decisions
interact both directly and indirectly, given that the demand function faced by each of
them depends upon aggregate income available for consumption and on the number of
rms (equal to the di¤erent varieties of goods) which operate at any given time. Hence,
interaction is direct and strategic through Bertrand competition on prices and indirect
and non strategic through the e¤ect of aggregate income. Particular attention must be
paid to this last term, as it is likely to determine both an aggregate income e¤ect and an
e¤ect due to the entry-exit process. While in standard models of monopolistic competition
the solution to the problem is represented by a symmetric Bertrand-Nash equilibrium,
obtained by assuming that rms are homogeneous and have common knowledge, with
asymmetric agents competitors prices have to be somehow forecasted. Heterogeneity
implies that agents lack su¢ cient information on the strategies adopted by competitors,
forcing them to rely on a simple static rule to form expectations on the general price
level.
The remainder of the paper reads as follows: in section 2 we briey review the em-
pirical evidence on the dynamics of the cross section over the business cycle, in section
3 we describe the theoretical model, in section 4 we report on a number of numerical
solutions of the model and establish the extent to which it can replicate the cross section
dynamics in the data, nally in section 5 we conclude.
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2 Some Stylised Features of the Business Cycle from
the Cross Section
In this section we briey consider some of the cross sectional features of the business
cycle revealed by the analysis of longitudinal data on rms for the US, the UK, Germany
and Italy. In Higson et al (2003, 2005) the methodology used measures of dispersion to
examine the relationship between the business cycle and the higher moments of the cross
sectional distribution calculated from rm growth rates. Here we use an alternative ap-
proach which ts a particular function (the Subbotin or Exponential Power Distribution)
to the cross section in each year and then observes the extent to which the parameters of
this distribution vary over the business cycle. We show that there are distinctive changes
in the shape of the cross sectional distributions associated with business cycle swings in
the macroeconomy.
Table (2.1) summarises the results for four countries, Italy, Germany, the UK and the
US. It provides a regression of real GDP growth on the cross sectional moments (mean
and skewness). All are at the annual frequency. The sample periods are given below
each country column. Each of the moments is regressed on lags of itself and current
and lagged GDP growth. In all cases there is a signicant positive correlation between
aggregate GDP growth and the mean growth rate in the cross section of rms. There is
also a signicant negative correlation between the aggregate growth rate and skewness in
the cross section.
Table 1: Regression of Mean and Skewness on GDP.
Germany Italy UK US
momemt () Mean Skewness Mean Skewness Mean Skewness Mean Skewness
constant -0.010 0.103 0.002 -0.020 -1.5753 0.083 -0.5207 -0.0344
(0.008) (0.002) (0.586) (0.584) (0.002) (0.063) (0.2627) (0.412)
t 1 0.103 0.127 0.323 0.033 0.2039 0.2169 0.4301 0.2772
(0.124) (0.129) (0.153) (0.902) (0.238) (0.223) (0.001) (0.041)
t 2 -2.240 -0.193 -0.1668 -0.2585
(0.015) (0.069) (0.105) (0.018)
ln(gdpt) 1.053 -8.077 1.426 -10.345 1.054 -0.0798 0.9443 -0.0596
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(gdpt 1) (-) (-) -0.719 1.959 0.4929 -0.0309 -0.1450 0.0022
(0.039) (0.520) (0.0488) (0.126) (0.289) (0.830)
Adjusted R2 0.856 0.810 0.848 0.754 0.832 0.774 0.743 0.755
LM(2) 0.491 0.547 0.482 0.720 3.85 2.591 0.026 0.680
Sample 1971-98 1984-04 1968-97 1951-01
2.1 Subbotin Distributions
There is a large empirical literature on the dynamics of rms and industries that has
established many stylised facts concerning the distribution of rmscharacteristics. How-
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ever, due to the limited availability of longitudinal establishment data, the literature on
industrial demography 4 has focused mainly on the staticproperties of the distribution
of variables such as size and growth, neglecting their possible variation over time. Follow-
ing Sutton (1997), a variety of lines of research have been followed by the conventional
industrial organization literature. One, based on Gibrats law (1931), assumes that the
growth rates of rms are independent of rmssize.
Gilbrats Law of Proportionate E¤ect implies that if the rates of growth of rms
are identically and independently distributed, the distribution of the rms size tends
asymptotically to a lognormal. It follows from this that the distribution of rmsrates of
growth is Gaussian. Nevertheless, more recent empirical studies in industrial demography
have detected two empirical regularities which are so widespread across countries and
persistent over time to be characterized as universal laws (a) the distribution of the size
of rms is right skewed and can be tted by a Power Law (or Zipf) probability density
function5; (b) the growth rates of rmsoutput follow a Laplace distribution.
Zipfs law is the discrete counterpart to the Pareto continuous distribution (power
law). It links the probability of observing the dimension of a phenomenon with rank
greater than, say, zi, with the cumulative frequency. Roughly speaking, a discrete random
variable Z is said to follow a Power Law (also known as Rank-Size, or Pareto-Levy)
distribution, if its cumulative distribution function takes the form
Pr(Z  zi) =

zi
z0

(2.1)
with zi  z0,  > 0, where z0 is the minimum e¢ cient size and  is the scaling
exponent or shape parameter.
Moreover, Stanley et al. (1996), Amaral et al. (1997) and Bottazzi and Secchi (2003)
have found that the growth rate of the output of rm yi follows, instead of a normal
distribution, a Laplace distribution:
L(yi; b) =
b
2
exp( byi) (2.2)
where b > 0 is the scale parameter. In order to explain these ndings, the literature
has pursued two lines of research. The rst focuses only on the statistical properties
of the link between the distribution of the size of rms and their rates of growth. For
instance, Reed (2001) shows that independent rates of change do not generate a lognormal
distribution of the size of rms if the time of observation of rms is not deterministic but
if it itself is a random variable following approximately an exponential distribution. In
this case, even if Gibrats law holds true at the individual level, rms will converge to a
double Pareto distribution.
The second line of research stresses the importance of non-price interactions among
rms hit by multiplicative shocks, hence building on the framework put forward by Her-
bert Simon and his co-authors during the 1950s and 60s. For example, Bottazzi and
Secchi (2003) obtain a Laplace distribution of rms growth rates within Simons model,
4See Steindl (1968), Geroski (1995), Sutton (1997) and Caves (1998) for comprehensive reviews of the
literature.
5See for instance Axtell (2001) and Ga¤eo et al. (2003).
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just by relaxing the assumption of independence of rmsgrowth rates.6 In the present
analysis, following Marsili et al. (2004), we will test the stability of the cross sectional
distribution of rmsrate of growth by tting an asymmetric Subbotin density, whose
symmetric counterpart encompasses the Laplace and the Gaussian densities as particular
cases.
2.1.1 The Asymmetric Subbotin Distribution
The fuctional form of the symmetric7 Subbotin distribution is characterised by three
parameters: a position parameter m (which is at the same time the mean, the median
and the mode of the density), a scale parameter a (describing the spread or width of the
density) and a shape parameter b (which is inversely related to the fatness of the tails)
and is described by
f(x; a; b;m) =
exp( 1
b
x m
a
b)
2ab1=b (1 + 1=b)
: (2.3)
Where   is the Gamma distribution. The symmetric Subbotin distribution encom-
passes the Gaussian and the Laplace (or double exponential) distributions as special cases:
for b = 2 it boils down to the Gaussian and for b = 1 to a Laplace, while for b  !1 the
distribution tends to a Uniform. The lower b, the fatter the tails: hence the distribution
is platikurtic for b > 2 while it is leptokurtic for b < 2. This symmetric version of the
Subbotin density has all central moments of odd order equal to zero. Following Bottazzi
and Secchi (2003), the central moment of order 2l is:
M2l =

ab1=b
2l  ((2l + 1)=b)
 (1=b)
: (2.4)
Particular interest will be attached in the subsequent analysis to the excess Kurtosis
exhibited by the tted distribution: in the symmetric case the index reads as follows
k =
 (1=b) (5=b)
[ (3=b)]2
: (2.5)
It is relatively straightforward to check that @k=@b < 0 for b > 0: this aspect will
turn out to be particularly important for our analysis of the dynamic pattern of higher
moments of the distribution.
6In principle, these results can lead to reject the strong version of Gibrats law. This law claims
that the distribution of the levels (rms size measured in output or capital units) is lognormal while the
empirical analysis points to Zipfs law - and the distribution of growth rates is normal while it seems
to be a Laplace. As a matter of fact, things are not that simple. The idea according to which Gibrats
law has to be fully discarded is wrong, given that in the recent literature a weak version seems to hold,
in which growth rates seem to be independent at least in mean. In fact, Lee et al. (1998) show that
the variance of growth rates depends negatively on rms size. The implications of the strong version of
Gibrats law are not necessarily true in the weak version. Fujiwara et al. (2003) have shown, in fact,
that if the distribution is characterized by time-reversal symmetry, i.e. the joint probability distribution
of two consecutive years is symmetric in its arguments P12(x1; x2) = P12(x2; x1); the weak version of
Gibrats law can yield a power law of rms size. Hence power law and Gibrats law (under its weak
version) are not necessarily inconsistent.
7This distribution was introduced originally by Subbotin (1923) and popularized by Box and Tiao
(1962, 1964, 1973), who used it in robustness studies (see also Tiao and Lund (1970), Swamy and Mehta
(1977), West (1984), and more recently Osiewalski and Steel (1993)).
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The asymmetric Subbotin density extends the family described above by allowing the
parameters a and b in the two halves of the density to take di¤erent values. Its functional
form depends on ve parameters: a positioning parameter m, two scale parameters al
and ar respectively for the values below or above m, and two shape parameters bl and
br characterizing, respectively, the lower and upper tail of the density. The following
factorisation has been introduced by Bottazzi and Secchi (2003)
P (X) =
 exp( (x m)=a)bl 1bl
A
x < m
exp( (x m)=a)br 1
br
A
x > m
where
A = alb
1
bl
l  

1 +
1
bl

+ arb
1
br
r  

1 +
1
br

:
2.1.2 Some Subbotin distributions for the US.
In this section we report on some estimated Subbotin distributions for the US using the
same data that was used for the US results shown in Table (2.1), but highlighting a
subset of years associated with particularly extreme swings of the business cycle. These
are shown below8. In Figure (2.1.2) we plot the estimated Subbotin distributions for
1972 to 1975, and in Figure (2.1.2) for 1989 to 1993. These scan two signicant business
cycles in the US. They all show a shift in the distribution from one skewed to the left
during major upswings to skewness to the right in recession periods, and then a return
to a distribution that is closer to a Laplace distribution.
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8For a fuller analysis of this see Santoro (2006).
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The aim of the remainder of this paper is to describe a model that draws on the
literature that emphasises the credit channel and nancial accelerator aspects of the
monetary transmission process, to allow for explicit forms of cross sectional heterogeneity,
and then to see whether a simulated version of such a model can capture some of the
movements in the moments of the cross sctional distributions at business cycle frequencies.
3 The Model Setup
In this section we turn to a model that we evaluate to establish whether it is capable of
generating some of the stylised features of the cross sectional business cycle. The model
contains heterogeneous rms in a monopolistically competitive framework.
The economy consists of two markets: goods and credit. The goods market is monop-
olistically competitive along the lines of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). The population
of rms in the economy produces a single good in nt varieties in each period. The demand
side of the economy is not explicitly modelled. It is assumed that there is a representative
consumer endowed with a CES utility function, who in each period demands a bundle Ct
of di¤erentiated goods:
Ct = n
1
1 
t
 
ntX
i=1
C
 1

it
! 
 1
:
In each period the ith rm in the economy faces the following demand function for its
good:
Y dit =

pit
pt
 
Yt
nt
;  > 1 (3.6)
where pit denotes the price charged by the ith rm, Yt is income,  is the elasticity of
substitution between pairs of goods, while pt is the aggregate price level:
pt =
 
1
nt
ntX
i=1
pit
1 
! 1
1 
: (3.7)
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We assume that each rm in the economy produces a di¤erentiated good by means of
a decreasing returns to scale technology in which capital is the only input
Yit = tKit
;  < 1 (3.8)
where t represents the productivity parameter common to all rms, which is assumed
to follow an stationary AR(1) process
t = t 1 + "t (3.9)
where 0 <  < 1 and "t is an iid shock to t with constant standard deviation ":
Assuming no depreciation, the law of motion of the capital stock is expressed by:
Kit = Kit 1 + Iit (3.10)
where Iit denotes the investment undertaken by the ith rm at time t.
Firms nance their production costs at least partially by means of internally generated
funds inherited from the previous period, as net worth, denoted by Ait. The end of any
period balance sheet implies that:
Kit = Ait + Lit (3.11)
where Li are bank loans. The ratio of net worth to total capital - the equity ratio -
provides an index for the nancial robustness of the rm. Firms accumulate net worth
by means of retained prots, according to the following law of motion
Ait+1 = it + Ait (3.12)
where it denotes the retained prots for the ith rm at time t.
It is assumed that rms are completely rationed on the equity market (Greenwald
and Stiglitz , 1993). If internally generated funds are not enough to nance investment,
the rm relies on the credit market.9
The production cycle starts at the beginning of time t;and takes one period. At the
beginning of period t, nt rms adopt Bertrand strategies, determining their optimal price
(hence their output and capital, through the demand function and the production function
respectively), given income available for consumption, and the aggregate price index. The
latter is an indicator of the average strategies undertaken by competitors. Goods are sold
at the end of the period. Furthermore, rms must nance new capital before goods are
sold. Production in period t will depend, therefore, on nancial conditions inherited from
the period, t   1. Given this setup, each rm incurs a nancing cost FCit equal to the
service on debt and payment of dividends (Delli Gatti et al., 2000):
FCit = ritL
d
it + r
A
itAit (3.13)
where rit is the contractual real interest rate on loans paid by the ith rm, while
rAit is the return on net worth, paid out in the form of dividends. Debt commitments
9Although rms could in principle issue new equities, this option is a priori ruled out, due to the
possibility that equity issues would be subject to adverse selection (Myers and Majluf (1984), Greenwald
et al. (1984)), and would be too costly to rms. Following Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), new equity
issues contribute little to corporate nance: at a given share price, only overvalued rms are willing to
sell their shares; potential shareholders anticipate this fact, and no trade occurs on the equity market .
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are determined by the rm specic interest rate on loans, set in every period by the
commercial bank.
Real prots are the di¤erence between real revenues and real costs. It is assumed that
each rms total revenues are subject to a multiplicative idiosyncratic shock !it, which
is uniformly and independently (over time and across rms) distributed over the positive
support [0; !] and has an expected value E(!it) = 1: For simplicity, we assume that the
contractual interest rate equals the return on net worth. Hence, real prots for the ith
rm are:
it = !it

pit
pt
1 
Yt
nt
  rit
 
pit
pt
 
Yt
tnt
! 1

: (3.14)
In this uncertain environment, rms risk bankruptcy if their net worth at the end of the
period is negative. In order to simplify matters, we assume that the ex-ante probability
of bankruptcy PBit is proportionate to the ratio of debt to total capital inherited from
the previous period:
PBit =
Lit 1
Kit 1
= 1  Ait 1
Kit 1
: (3.15)
The probability of bankruptcy is decreasing in net worth. Dening the leverage li as
the ratio of debt to net worth, we get:
li =
Li
Ai
=
PBi
1  PBi
and
PBi =
li
1 + li
: (3.16)
The probability of bankruptcy is an increasing and concave function of leverage and
so:
lim
li!1
PBi = 1:
When debt increases relative to net worth, the nancial condition of the rm worsens
and the probability of bankruptcy increases. In the case of a particularly unbalanced
nancial structure, even a small exogenous shock (aggregate or idiosyncratic) can trigger
bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy is costly, so we assume that these costs are proportional to total sales
BCi = c

pit
pt
1 
Yt
nt
; c > 0: (3.17)
The problem facing the rm is to maximise expected prots (with respect to the
relative price pit
pet
) net of bankruptcy costs:
Max
pit
pt
E
24pit
pt
1 
Yt
nt
(1  cPBit)  rit
 
pit
pt
 
Yt
tnt
! 1

35 : (3.18)
Notice that the ith rm knows neither the actual price charged by competitors, nor
the aggregate price level, information about which becomes available only at the end of
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the period. Firms set their prices simultaneously given their private information, but
price decisions interact both directly and indirectly, given that the demand function
faced by each rm depends upon the aggregate income available for consumption and
on the number of rms and the variety of goods in the economy at time t, nt. Hence
interaction is direct and strategic through Bertrand competition on prices and indirect
and non strategic through the term Yt
nt
; which is likely to provide both an aggregate
income e¤ect (captured by Yt) and a second round e¤ect due to the entry-exit process
(captured by nt). While in standard models of monopolistic competition the outcome
of competition is represented by a symmetric Bertrand-Nash equilibrium - obtained by
assuming that rms are homogeneous and have common knowledge - with heterogeneous
agents competitorsprices have to be forecasted. In the present context, since rms are
subject to an idiosyncratic shock, whose e¤ect will depend upon the nancial condition
of the rm, and since an entry process of new rms will be explicitly modeled, after the
rst period (in which a symmetric Nash equilibrium is assumed) the economy will be
populated by heterogeneous agents. This feature of the model enables us to keep track
of the evolution over time of the distributions of the size of rms and their rates of
growth. Simulations of the model will rely on a simple rule, assuming that rms forecast
their competitorsprices using backward looking expectations, pet = pt 1, or they rely on
an AR(2) predictor. From the rst order condition we end up with the following price
decision rule for the ith rm:
pit
pet
=

ritaKit 1
(   1)xit 1at
 1


Yt
nt
a 1

(3.19)
where xit 1 = Kit 1   c(Kit 1   Ait 1), a = 1 and  = 1 + (a  1).
The optimal price set by the ith rm is an increasing function both of the interest
rate on loans rit and of the marginal cost of bankruptcy. Output associated with this
optimal price is:
Y sit =

ritaKit 1
(   1)xit 1at
  


Yt
nt
&
(3.20)
where & = 1  

(a  1):
The rst order condition for the demand for capital goods is then:
Kdit =

ritaKit 1
(   1)xit 1at
  a


a( 

 1)
t

Yt
nt
&a
: (3.21)
As one would expect, the optimal capital stock is a non-linear, negative function of the
interest rate and a non-linear, increasing function of net worth, Ait 1. A deterioration
in the nancial position of a rm has a negative e¤ect on output. The production of
each rm, because it is linked to aggregate income through the negatively sloped demand
function, will in turn depend on the general nancial state of the economy and on the
number of bankruptcies that occurred in the previous period. Therefore, relaxing the
assumption of Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) of a perfectly competitive goods market
and assuming heterogeneous monopolistically competitive rms, creates interdependence
among rms. This mean eld interaction is determined, among other things, by the
general nancial state of the economy.
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3.1 The Credit Market
Investment at time t is the di¤erence between the desired capital stock and the capital
stock inherited from the past
Iit = Kit  Kit 1: (3.22)
To nance investment, each rm uses retained prots and, if necessary, resorts to the
credit market. Given the balance sheet identity, the demand for credit at the beginning
of period t will be equal to:
Lit = K
d
it   Ait: (3.23)
After substituting for the demand for capital, we end up with the following relation:
Ldit =

ritaKit 1
(   1)xit 1at
  a


a( 

 1)
t

Yt
nt
&a
  it 1 + Ait 1: (3.24)
For tractibility, we assume there is one bank in the model functioning as a vertically
integrated banking sector. If all rms repay debt, the bank would be certain that its
liquidity constraint is satised. Depending on the nancial status and on the overall
credit market performance of each rm, the banking sector, in each period, renegotiates
the conditions on loans extended to each rm. Each contractual interest rate, negotiated
at time t, embodies both a rm specic risk of default and a macroeconomic index of
credit performance, which describes the rate of default in the economy as a whole. The
contractual interest rate is set as a mark-up on the interbank interest rate, it:
rit = (1 + it(PBit; dt 1)) it (3.25)
where it(PBit; dt 1) is the mark-up function, which depends upon the probability of
bankruptcy for the ith rm and on the rate of default at the previous period, denoted by
dt 1.
We compute the rate of default as the volume of performing loans allotted by the
commercial banking sector in the previous period, relative to the total debt extended:
dt =
LBt
LTt
(3.26)
where LTt is total credit extended by the commercial banking sector in period t and
LBt is the total "bad debt" in period t, dened as the sum of the debt of rms going bust
at the end of the period.
Alternatively we can write the markup function it(PBit; dt 1) in linear form, as a
weighted average of its arguments:
it(PBit; dt 1) = PBit + (1  )dt 1;  > 0:5: (3.27)
The commercial banking sector attaches greater importance to the rm specic risk
of default. Given these features, the contractual rate of interest will can be expressed as:
rit = [1 + PBit + (1  )dt 1]it: (3.28)
This produces an innitely elastic credit supply function that shifts on the orthant
frit; Litg depending on the rm specic probability of bankruptcy, on an overall index of
credit default risk and on the interbank rate. Thus, the central bank can at least partially
control the interest rate applied by the banking sector to each rm. Notice that, as the
probability of bankruptcy goes to zero, the interest rate on a rm specic loan will equal
the interest rate set by the central bank only if the systemic default rate is also equal to
zero.
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3.2 Industrial Demography
The process of entry and exit by rms will have an e¤ect on the dynamics of the cross
sectional distribution of the rates of growth and this will also depend on the degree of
nancial vulnerability of the entire economy. The demographic process inuences the
demand function faced by each incumbent through the interplay of the aggregate income
available for consumption, that in turn depends upon the nancial robustness of the
economy as a whole, and through the number of incumbents, which is determined by
the turnover between rms going bust and new entrants. This "direct"10 mean interac-
tion e¤ect is likely to drive the dynamics of the aggregate output and to have serious
distributive implications.
Davis et al.(1996) have shown that the turnover of rms entering and exiting markets
contributes almost as much to employment and output uctuations as incumbent rms.
This suggets that we should pay particular attention to the way entry and exit of rms
is modeled. As we already know exits are traced back to nancially weak rms, whose
leverage is so high that an adverse shock makes net worth become negative. In the
literature, the entry process has been modelled as a purely stochastic process (Winter
et al. (1997), or as an endogenous process (Hopenhayn (1992)), depending on expected
prot opportunities. However, according to Caves (1998), we can rely on the observation
that entrants are generally unsure about the probability of prospective success, and that
entries do not occur at a unique optimal size.
We model the entry process in an adaptive way. Each exiting rm is replaced by a
new entrant. Furthermore, we assume that new rms enter at a scale of production equal
to the average of the incumbent population11.
3.3 The Central Bank
In our framework the dynamics of the economy are driven by the credit cycle and by
the propagation mechanism of idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, whose e¤ect depends
upon the degree of nancial heterogeneity. We assume that the Central Bank follows
a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing which implies a short run trade o¤ between
output growth and the deviation of the rate of ination from its target value:
it = it 1 + (1  ) (1 log yt + 2(t   )) ; 0 <  < 1 (3.29)
10Delli Gatti et al. (2005) develop a perfectly competitive framework where a mean eld interaction
arises as a result of a bank e¤ect (Hubbard et al., 2002). In their model, if a rm goes bankrupt,
not only does aggregate output decline, but also bank equity is directly a¤ected. As a consequence,
credit extended goes down, pushing up the interest rate charged to each rm, which spreads nancial
fragility and increases the risk of bankruptcy for the whole population of rms. Some of the rms which
are particularly nancially fragile will default and leave the market, while surviving rmsoutput and
investment will shrink. An analogous domino e¤ect is at work in our model, but in the present context
the propagation mechanism acts through two channels. First, it propagates directly through the market
for goods, via the demand function, and second, through the credit market, given that banks set the
rm-specic contractual interest rate by adding a default risk premium to the rate of interest set by the
monetary authority. Furthermore, there is an interdependence between these two channels, since the
cental bank follows a Taylor rule.
11We have tried to implement both fully stochastic entry mechanisms or hybrid strategies in which the
probabilistic process is a¤ected by prospective performance, and entry can take place at di¤erent sizes.
As in previous studies (e.g. Delli Gatti et al. (2005)) the entry process does not seem to qualitatively
a¤ect the simulation results.
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where  is the interest rate smoothing parameter and t and  are the average rate of
ination and the target rate of ination respectively and yt is aggregate output. As usual
parameters 1 and 2 describe the relative importance that the central bank attributes
to output growth and to the excess of ination over its target.
4 Model Simulation
The model described in the previous section does not have a closed form analytical so-
lution. The basic properties of the framework will be analysed, therefore, through sim-
ulation. We can draw some implications from the expression describing the response of
rm specic production to total real income. First, notice that the impact of macroeco-
nomic uctuations is non-linear. Second, the nancial structure plays a crucial role in
the response of individual rms. Recall the demand function faced by each producer:
Yit =

pit
pt
 
Yt;  > 1
where we have replaced the term Yt
nt
with Yt. Notice that the latter is equal to the
market share of the ith rm along a symmetric equilibrium, where pit = pt. This provides
a useful benchmark, since it represents the outcome of standard models of monopolistic
competition, in which the solution to the problem is represented by a symmetric Bertrand-
Nash equilibrium, obtained by assuming that rms are homogeneous.
The relative competitive position of the rm is then given by the ratio of the e¤ective
demand to the potential market share in the representative agent case:
Sit =
Yit
Yt
=

pit
pt
 
i = 1; ::; n: (4.30)
The latter can be seen as an index of competitiveness of the ith rm, while the mo-
nopolistic competition setting can be regarded as a competition over market shares. As
it is clear from expression above, Sit is a negative function of the rm specic price. At
this stage it is useful to recall the rms optimal reaction function in this framework, in
which we assume c = 1 (without loss of generality) and denoting the equity ratio Ai
Ki
by
ei :
pit = p
e
t

a
   1
rit
eit 1
a
t
 1

Y
a 1

t : (4.31)
The price set by the ith rm is a negative function of its nancial state, captured by
the equity ratio at the beginning of the period12. A better nancial state allows the rm
to be more competitive and to supply more13.
Given these general features of the model, we need a competitive mechanism, which
is strictly related to the level of nancial vulnerability/strength of the rm in order to
determine rm specic and aggregate prices. The mechanism we are going to use here
can be formalised along the lines suggested by evolutionary dynamics. In the following
12Recall also that the real contractual interest rate is a negative function of the equity ratio: this
feature amplies the e¤ect of the nancial structure through the credit market.
13However, the relevance of the equity ratio for the monopolistic pricing is limited above by
Kit 1(eit 1 = 1).
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we will abstract from considerations regarding changes in the level of productivity and
the demographic process. Given that rms are heterogeneous from the nancial point
of view, the relative price changes over time. It is clear from the (??) and the (4.31)
that the ith rm will be able to survive in a competitive environment as long as its price
increases less than the average price level14. This is possible if the nancial structure,
proxied by the equity ratio, allows the rm to be competitive and to lower the price, in
order to supply more and to gain market share. In such an environment, the margin of
manovrability on prices, which is positively related to the equity ratio, becomes crucial
for survival and growth. Hence nancial structure has a direct inuence on the rise of
frictions in the price setting system. During an expansion, the relative market share Sit
decreases, if Yit increases less rapidly than Yt. Thus, if a rm is not able to lower its
price, it will lose market shares. Given that the main determinant of price setting is the
state of nancial tness, a rm in nancial distress will have a competitive disadvantage,
which translates into downward stickiness.
We simulate a model with 1500 to 2000 rms over 300 periods. All simulations refer
to a benchmark parameter setup. Homogeneity of initial conditions was assumed in order
not to bias the micro and macro dynamics. At time 0 rms experience no idiosyncratic
shocks and have the same nancial structure, while the relative price is homogeneous and
normalised to 1. Furthermore, in order to assess the impact of the degree of concentration
in the market we will consider three values for the elasticity of substitution ( = 3; 5; 10).
The remaining parameters have been calibrated to the following values:
i0 c   !   1 2 
 e0
0:05 1 0:98 0:95 2 0:8 0:95 0:5 1:5 0:02 0:6
In order to establish whether aggregate variables match empirical dynamic regularities
and whether cross sectional moments of the rmsrate of growth distribution are in line
with recent empirical work discussed above, we analyse the simulated data both from a
time series and from a cross sectional perspective.
4.1 Cross Sectional Evidence and Sensitivity Analysis
Our primary interest is whether the simulated model can replicate the negative correlation
between the aggregate business cycle and cross sectional skewness. The results of a series
of regressions of the cross sectional mean and skewness on the aggregate growth rate
generated by the model simulation are reported in Table (4.4). The results are shown
for three values of the price elasticity of demand. As we move closer to a perfectly
competitive environment, ( = 10) we note that correlation of the cross section mean
with the aggregate growth rate decreases: same conclusions apply to the skewness. For
this model with imperfectly competitive markets and heterogeneity in the nancial state
of each rm the higher moments of the distribution of the rates of growth are correlated
14The tness function and the replicator function describing the evolution of the population composi-
tion are sign compatible, that is they have the same sign, whenever Si(t) > 1. Under this condition, we
can follow the arguments reported in Joosten (1996) and Ga¤eo (1999) to prove that the deterministic
system ( no demographic growth) admits at least one xed point. Furthermore, every stable xed point
is a saturated equilibrium, that is an equilibrium at which each survived rm has highest tness. As
the dynamic process goes on, rms whose nancial position prevents them from having a mergin of
manovrability on prices eventually go bankrupt, and the number of operating rms shrinks. Eventually,
only the ttest rms will survive.
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with the cycle, replicating some of the characteristic patterns described in Higson et al.
(2002, 2004). For the sake of convenience, the reported evidence refers to the last 50
periods of the simulation (at a cut-o¤ of +/- 100%, but results prove to be quite robust
for larger or narrower ranges of growth ). What is really striking is the counter-cyclical
behaviour of skewness.
Table 2: Regression of Mean and Skewness on GDP in Simulated Data.
 = 3  = 5  = 10
Mean Skewness Mean Skewness Mean Skewness
Constant -0.066 0.161 -0.059 0.056 -0.059 0.325
(-5.29) (2.24) (-4.34) (0.33) (-3.72) (2.19)
Momentt 1 -0.552 -0.627 -0.4180 0.122 -0.286 0.144
(-3.53) (-7.81) (-4.45) (1.11) (-2.70) (1.19)
1n(gdpt) 0.489 -3.936 0.419 -3.665 0.413 -3.288
(6.09) (-7.33) (6.20) (4.09) (7.57) (-5.95)
1n(gdpt 1) 0.288 -2.295 0.3048 -0.605 0.232 0.466
(2.56) (-3.95) (4.32) (-0.60) (3.42) (0.76)
Adjusted R2 0.662 0.552 0.473 0.497 0.502 0.451
In order to assess whether nancial frictions actually drive the observed counter-
cyclical skewness, we compare the correlation coe¢ cient between the third empirical
moment and the cycle indicator after switching o¤ bankruptcy costs (c = 0). Our re-
sults, reported in Table 4.5, suggest that the nagative correlation drops drastically when
bankruptcy costs are zero, from a coe¢ cient of about  0:8 down to a negligible level.
This result is not surprising itself: if expected bankruptcy costs are not accounted for,
the mark-up does not depend upon the rms nancial state and the only factor di¤er-
entiating rms is the idiosycratic perturbation on total revenues. This element is found
to be not enough to generate counter-cyclical skewness.15
For the sake of completeness we also tted Subbotin distributions to a business cycle
phase of the simulated data ( = 3). This is shown for a business cycle upswing and then
15In principle we can envisage a numer of mechanisms that, by exerting a direct or indirect e¤ect on
the mark-up, could give rise to the characteristic contorsions identied in the real data. One of this
elements could be, for instance, R&D expenditure. However we suggest that the e¤ectiveness of these
additional factors can be reconduced, in most of the cases, to the nancial tness of the rm. As a
matter of fact, the availability of internal or external nance are crucial in determining entrepreneurial
activities other than production, such as R&D expenditure, product di¤erentiation, advertisement, etc..
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Table 3: Correlation Between Skewness and GDP rate of Growth in Simulated Data.
 = 3  = 5  = 10
Bankruptcy Costs -0.874 -0.856 -0.812
No Bankruptcy Costs -0.134 -0.074 -0.091
downswing in Figure 4.1. The pattern of cross sectional distortion of the distribution is
clear.
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Simulated Subbotin: Transition from Recession to
Expansion
As to non linearities, we simulate the model under a perfectly competitive benchmark
( !1), in order to assess whether the competitive mechanism is responsible, along with
the nancial fragility e¤ect, for the observed cross sectional pattern. Simulations generally
produce, both with and without expected bankruptcy costs, extremely fat tailed and tent
shaped distributions, whose skewness is generally extremely low and not correlated with
aggregate dynamics. The joint contribution of the imperfectly competitive framework
and nancial fragility appears to be an important ingredient for reproducing the counter-
cycical skewness.16
16As a matter of fact, the perfectly competitive agent based framework put forward by Delli Gatti et
al. (2005) is not capable to reproduce the characteristic contorsions in the distribution of rates of growth,
even in presence of nancial fragility. On the other side, the model is capable to reproduce the most
commonly found static regularity in terms of shape, generating nearly symmetric Laplace-type empirical
densities.
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5 Conclusions
This paper has attempted to construct a model of heterogeneous rms di¤erentiated by
the state of their nances. Simulations of the model suggest that we can replicate some
of the cross sectional features that have been detected recently in the literature using
longitudinal data on rms in the US, UK, Germany and Italy. We use a model with a
monopolistically competitive market. Financial conditions a¤ect both the rm-specic
level of output and competitorsoutput through the conventional demand function of
monopolistic competition à la Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). The resulting economy is
characterised by the presence of both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, that determine
an explicit risk of bankruptcy, which, depending on their nancial structure, is di¤erent
across rms. Over the business cycle, in our simulation model we observe systematic
shifts in the cross section, with in particular, a negative correlation between skewness
and the aggregate business cycle.
[18]
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